The process of blocking Strandhogg and ensuring protection of Android apps in relation to overlay attacks
A malware is known to adopt itself and evolve on conditions emerging in the environment. The versions of Strandhogg and Strandhogg 2.0 overlay malware variants turn out to be perfect examples of this. Their variants have become powerful over a period of time and how they go on to abuse normal Android functions to be specifically targeting apps that relies on the use of such applications. StrandHogg ends up resorting to a mix of privilege escalation, trickery and a host of Android functions for expanding the attack surface and multiple ways by which it may prevent fraud.
What is StrandHogg and why banking devices are its target?
StrandHogg is an Android vulnerability that allows a malicious software to hijack a legal app operating on the same device, possibly revealing private SMS messages and photographs, login passwords, GPS movements, phone calls, and more.
As part of an overlay attack, StrandHogg uses a variety of approaches to abuse regular Android features and exploit software vulnerabilities. In an overlay attack, specifically built malware is used to deceive mobile users into interacting with harmful material that is hidden from view, obscured, covered by another button or window, or otherwise disguised. Malware is frequently developed to contextually match the app’s logic and interaction patterns in order to trick the mobile user into believing that the requested action is desirable or useful to them. However, in practise, the opposite is true as the user’s behaviour benefits the attacker, usually in the form of privilege escalations that allow them to gain control of the surroundings and assumes the identity of the user.
The harmful content must be non-obvious to users and undetected by malware detection tools in order for an overlay attack to be successful, and the ways StrandHogg utilises to misuse Android features accomplish this. This blog has further information about overlay attacks. I’ll now explain how StrandHogg accomplishes all of these nefarious tasks, including how it exploits both host and target apps and how it abuses standard Android functionality, a typical example of OWASP’s “Improper Platform Usage.” But don’t worry; you can prevent StrandHogg malware from infecting your Android apps with Appdome. Continue reading to find out how.
At the crisp is the issue of multi- tasking with the banks. Hence it is known to exploit Android app settings taskAffinity and taskReparenting are options in the multitasking system that allow apps, even malicious ones, to freely adopt the identity of another task. It allows malicious activity to hijack the target’s task, so that the hijacked tasks would appear instead of the original tasks the next time the user accesses the target app. The rogue programme will ask for permission to use the device’s camera, microphone, messages, GPS, and storage throughout this interception. The malicious software receives access to these components if the user gives these permissions.
The working of StrandHogg
In all the versions of it, on an Android device a malicious app is installed that is operational in the background. Then it resorts to the use of faking the real apps on the same device. The process is undertaken by an overlay attack. When you click the normal button or icon of an app there is an execution of a malicious overlay rather than the user thinks on what they have clicked.
After execution, the malicious app tricks the users to provide permission to the malicious app or send out permission that may send out sensitive information to an attacker. What it allows is that it will allow the attackers to steal pin codes, deals with multi- factor authentication, intercept or read messages or start a click bot. This is going to launch a barrage of automated clicks in a shopping app or a mobile game which is going to generate fraudulent revenue.
Coming to the examples the first one is an overlay attack where StandHogg is going to develop a fake log in to be stealing details of the bank. Secondly it may go on to impersonate a genuine app to trick the users for giving out permission to the malicious app. The user is of the false assumption that they are granting permissions to the genuine app. If successful this attacker is able to exert control over the app or the environment, record messages, intercept text messages, cope up with ransom ware attacks and a lot more.
How StrandHogg is different from the earlier versions?
The new version of StrandHogg 2.0 would be an updated version of the overlay malware setting the tone for using various explicit methods. There use is at a much larger scale that would make it difficult to detect.
StrandHogg 2.0 uses “reflection” to carry out exploits, which allows the malware to dynamically take the identity of genuine programmes during runtime with the click of a single button, and in a way that is tailored to the resources/assets of the target apps StrandHogg encounters. All of the essential app permissions had to be stated upfront in the Android manifest in previous versions of StrandHogg.
As a result, previous StrandHogg versions could only be performed one at a time on apps. StrandHogg 2.0 may be used against a large number of apps at once. Platforms like Appselling can of immense help in such cases.
To sum up things how much you love to say common sense turns out to be the best guide. Suppose if you are using an app and find it strange, and though you may feel it to be great it is better to deal with a sceptical approach. An example is do not input your payment information if it asks you to do so. Out of the blue do not give extra permissions to the app if it requires you to do.
There are subtle signs in this regard as the app you have already logged in may ask you for the permission all over again. Certain typos and other mistakes will emerge on the app itself is a warning sign.
